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In its beginnings about fifty years ago zoning meant dividing the
territory of a city or other urban area into districts having different
use and development regulations. When a landowner claimed that
the regulation was an unconstitutional restraint on his freedom of
choice as to use of his land (denial of due process), the local govern-
ment defended the regulation in terms of what it prevented the owner
from doing. A substantial relation existed, the local government
claimed, between the health and welfare of the community and the
exclusion from the district of incompatible uses that the owner might
choose. In addition to this due process problem there was an equal
protection requirement: land similarly situated had to have similar
restrictions. These requirements were so simple and self-evident that
there was no "dilemma";1 the choice of preventing bad neighboring
uses was clearly more satisfactory than the choice of allowing an
owner to exercise his freedom by introducing harmful uses.
But city planners do not like to be merely policemen promoting a
policy of "good neighborliness." And it was not very exciting to design
plans that forever divided the city into firmly bounded districts with
permanent height, bulk, and use characteristics. So planners began
to claim that planning and zoning were not really "end states" but a
process to manage and guide the future uses of urban land resources.
Just as the manager of a business firm is able to reallocate his firm's
resources from time to time, they argued, so should the planner have
the flexibility that is inherent in "management." The citizens on the
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1 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). This case and Nectow v.
City of Cambridge, 277 US. 183 (1928), so firmly established the "nuisance" principle in
zoning that a zoning problem did not reach the United States Supreme Court again for
over twventy-five years. See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
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city planning commission or on the city or county council, who
tended to be business managers in their private lives, quickly under-
stood and approved these demands for flexibility. But the lawyers and
judges guarding the Constitution had a little more difficulty with the
idea of granting broad discretion to the planner. The planners first
proposed what was in effect a simple, one-sentence zoning law: "No
development may take place in this community without the consent
of the city planner." The courts decided, however, that this did not
comport with the Constitution; there had to be some standards estab-
lished in advance of actual decision to guide the planner in deciding
whether to grant or withhold permission for a material change in the
use or development of a parcel of private land,2 and there had to be
some definite procedure for making a decision.
The planner, after some half-hearted efforts to identify criteria to
write into law as a guide to his managerial tendencies, ran back to his
legislative bosses on the city planning commission or county council
for protection. Although many planners had argued that they should
be part of the executive branch, the Standard City Planning Enabling
Act3 made them advisors to the city council. Significantly, constitu-
tional standards constraining a legislature are far weaker than those
constraining an executive: a possibility of promoting general welfare
without overt discrimination was all that was required and little or no
hearing process was necessary. Thus, the zoning ordinance returned to
the form originally envisioned by the founders of zoning but with a
different reality. Almost all land, or at least all land for which a
material change in use was to be expected in the foreseeable future,
was districted but assigned to a "too restrictive" district. Under these
restrictions a landowner who wanted to build could not do anything
economically viable without applying to the legislative body for an
amendment to the zoning ordinance which would cover only his par-
ticular land.
Initially this "spot-zoning" procedure appeared to be incompatible
with constitutional concepts of fair play,4 but the courts eventually
concluded that if the process required presentation of the matter to
expert planners, who recommended approval of the spot change on
2 See the difficulty the court had with a law authorizing granting a variance "for special
reasons" in Ward v. Scott, 11 NJ. 117, 98 A.2d 885 (1952).
3 Published by the United States Department of Commerce in 1928. This model and its
zoning counterpart, the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (rev. ed. 1926), are reprinted
in MODEL LANn DEVELOPMENT CODE apps. A, B (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1968).
4 See Bartram v. Zoning Comm'n, 186 Conn. 89, 93-94, 68 A.2d 308, 810-11 (1949). See
also 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING §§ 5.04-.13 (1968).
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the basis of some preconceived plan, the constitutional defect was
removed. Yet the master plans, which like the old zoning ordinances
tended to have prestated physical location, were also thought to be
too restrictive of managerial skills. Consequently, locational plans
were abandoned in favor of "policy plans," which were merely
commonplace rules of thumb such as: "Since multi-family residential
areas are complementary to shopping areas and other primary service
facilities, they may logically be developed adjacent to such uses."5
Such a plan is "implemented" by putting all undeveloped land in
the urban area into zones classified as "agriculture," "single family
residence," or "low density multiple family dwellings." The expec-
tation is that any person owning land in these categories that he thinks
is or will be adjacent to a shopping or other urbanized area will, if he
decides to build high-density, multifamily dwellings, apply to the
city council for an amendment to the zoning ordinance to reclassify
his land. The new zoning ordinance based on the "policy" plan usually
provides for application directly to the planning agency, which prior
to action by the city council must make a recommendation stating
whether the proposed amendment conforms to the policy plan. Some
communities streamline the amendment process even further by
providing that the legislative body be regarded as having approved
the amendment if it does not formally disapprove it within a specified
time after receiving the favorable recommendation of the planner.
It is this policy planning process that Professor Mandelker ana-
lyzed and studied. His model is that of a local government guiding
future development by utilizing the amendment process in the zoning
ordinance to allocate land resources in accordance with a prestated
comprehensive plan. The King County plan recommends that apart-
ments be permitted in some portions of the county, primarily near
major highways and major shopping and cultural centers. Professor
Mandelker studied 170 apartment rezoning amendment applications
that were processed between September, 1967 and September, 1968.
One purpose of the study was to determine which of the criteria in
the policy-type plan appeared to have a substantial influence on the
resulting zoning pattern.
As to this aspect of the study, Professor Mandelker concludes that
"nothing in the comprehensive plan firmly told the zoning agencies
which were the preferred locations for apartment development." Since
none of the variables isolated in the study and in the plan "had an
5 Almost all modern plans of cities are in this form. For a partial illustration, see the
King County plan, which Professor Mandelker quotes at pages 121-22.
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appreciably high explanatory value," there is doubt that the adminis-
trators avoided "arbitrary decision-making." 6
In recent years lawyers have begun to express concern about the
system of zoning described by Professor Mandelker. One theme, ex-
pressed by Norman Williams, is that this system is a perversion of the
purpose of zoning, especially where prejudices against low- and
moderate-income apartment housing are involved, and that local
governments should be required to establish in advance districts where
all kinds of apartments may be located "as of right."7 Another ap-
proach, suggested by Richard Babcock, is that the irrationality of the
existing process should be controlled by subjecting zoning adminis-
tration to the rigorous requirements of administrative law (and there-
fore the adversary process) even if an amendment is involved.8 A third
argument, that of Bernard Siegan, is based on a comparison of an
area zoned under the system described by Professor Mandelker with
an area that is not zoned at all.2 It concludes that the zoning and
amendment process tends to do what the market would do if un-
restricted by zoning and that therefore the process only introduces a
costly bureaucratic delay. Since the administrators allow the developer
to do what the market would suggest that he should do, there is no
real management of the allocation of land resources.
It is interesting to note that the same problem that Professor
Mandelker perceived was seen by each of these authors without the
benefit of an elaborately constructed statistical study. Unlike Pro-
fessor Mandelker, however, each suggests a possible solution to the
problem. As the title of Professor Mandelker's book indicates, he sees
no solution but only a "dilemma."
What is his "dilemma"? I think it is his conclusion that whether
government attempts to manage the allocation of land resources by
administrative and "spot" amendments, as it does now, or attempts to
allocate land resources by public ownership and disposition on speci-
fied conditions, an alternative considered by Professor Mandelker, a
serious question of "equity" or discrimination among individuals
remains: some will be "given" apartment house value by the govern-
ment action and others, indistinguishable from them, will be denied
this benefit. He regrettably does not attempt to explain why these
6 Pp. 164, 167-68.
7 See Williams, Planning Law and the Supreme Court: II, 13 ZONING DIGEST 97, 116-23
(1961); Williams & Norman, Exclusionary Land Use Controls: The Case of North-Eastern
New Jersey, 22 SYRAcusE L. Ray. 475 (1971).
8 R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME: MUNICIPAL PRACTICES AND PoLICIES (1966).
9 Siegan, Non-Zoning in Houston, 13 J. LAw & ECON. 71 (1970).
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two methods of allocation are the only possible alternatives and con-
sequently fails to demonstrate that there is a "dilemma."
It is unfortunate that Professor Mandelker did not consider in
greater depth the economic history of the parcels studied and the
neighborhoods in which they are located. He examined a system in
which there was an apparent restriction on the supply of land avail-
able for apartment construction-a restriction arising from the fact
that not all land was legally available for apartments. His study
indicates, however, that approximately fifty-five percent of the re-
quested amendments were approved. He states that almost no apart-
ment construction resulted on the land rezoned and that at the time
of rezoning there was other land, already zoned to apartments, that
was vacant; but this finding is not drawn from his statistical survey.
His statement that the landowners who applied for rezoning were
trying to capture for their land a "floating apartment house value"
caused by the zoning process and that they did capture such value is
not supported by his factual study.
Professor Mandelker's conclusion that this assumed "floating apart-
ment house value" is an inequitable "externality" caused by the
zoning process is a questionable one. In an area without any zoning
some land would have apartment house value and some would not,
depending on the market's assessment of the highest and best use of
each parcel. Under a system in which a landowner must apply to the
government for an apartment house classification for land before it
can be called "apartment house land," the same result might well
follow. The zoning system requires in the first instance that some
owner do market research leading to a conclusion that there is a
demand for his land for apartment purposes. Depending on how the
zoning process is perceived in the commercial market, an owner of
"apartment house land" may be competing with all other land in the
area. For if the zoning administrators are likely to grant a zoning
amendment whenever a demand for apartment houses exists, then a
person seeking land for apartment uses really has a choice of all avail-
able land. True, the owner whose land is already zoned to apartments
may be able to get a higher price for his land, but only to the extent
of the value placed by the market on the elimination of one of the
transaction costs in using land for apartments-the cost of successfully
obtaining an amendment.
Indeed, the author seems to reach this conclusion himself in another
context. He states:
[P]ublic agencies probably do not control enough of the inputs
into the land development process to make the public control of
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land use and land development fully effective. Planning and
zoning agencies may make land use and development allocations,
but as the initiative for development remains in the private
sector they have no control over the pace and location of develop-
ment that occurs in response to planning and zoning proposals.10
This statement would seem to suggest that a restrictive zoning policy
does not increase the value of the land beyond that which the market
would assign to it in a nonzoning situation, except as to the effect of a
"prepaid" transaction cost on the value of a parcel already zoned to
apartments.
The quoted statement of Professor Mandelker, however, is of pro-
found importance for policy makers and planners, including the
embryonic variety-the law and planning students--for whom in part
the author states he has written the book. Government policy con-
stituting an action program designed to achieve a particular societal
goal must be constructed with full knowledge of which matters are
controllable by government and which matters are not. The policy
maker or planner could, of course, attempt to produce the state or
condition that a study of the uncontrolled private decisions would
indicate is the trend, Thus, if the uncontrolled private decisions of
land owners, developers, and consumers appear to be producing
apartment development in suburbs and "clusters," the planning
agency could recommend in a policy-type plan that the suburbs make
land available as needed for apartment construction but only clustered
around urban centers. That is not, however, a government plan in
the true sense of the word since it is not calculated to produce a result
different from that which the sum total of relatively free private
decisions would otherwise produce.
The uncontrollable elements referred to by Professor Mandelker
are even more significant in a real attempt at government planning. A
policy maker must determine which elements he can control, which
he can merely influence, and which he cannot affect at all. If un-
controlled decisions in housing tend to produce development of "high-
rent" apartments and apartments for one- or two-person families in
suburbs, elimination by the suburban community of its requirements
for single-family housing or large acreage per dwelling unit will not
produce low-rent apartment housing; the trend of uncontrolled deci-
sions indicates either that low-income families do not wish to com-
pete for apartment shelter in the suburbs or that the intense un-
satisfied demand of the affluent for suburban housing excludes them
10 Pp. 176-77.
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from the market. If it is government policy to encourage economic
and social integration of high-rent areas, efforts must be directed to
either controlling or influencing the decisions of low-income and high-
income households in order to induce the poor to live in suburbs and
the wealthy to live elsewhere.
Given our existing values about liberty, it is hard to imagine a
program of controlling private decision by prohibiting the rich from
living in the suburbs and compelling the poor to live there. The
alternative seems to be that of "purchasing" uncontrollable decisions.
Many existing programs and proposals seem to ignore the large
number of uncontrolled elements in any problem. Certainly existing
programs for government intervention in the housing market do not
seem to achieve their assumed goals.
The skepticism that Professor Mandelker expresses about the possi-
bility of achieving certain goals by planning is a welcomed antidote
to the claim that planning can solve problems. It is too bad, however,
that Professor Mandelker found himself on dead center-the horns
of a dilemma. Government policy makers cannot resign so easily.
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